MCP tools

MCP scopes and tokens

Issuing scoped MCP tokens and revoking them safely.

Showly MCP tokens are how agents authenticate. This page covers how to issue them, how to scope them tightly, and how to rotate or revoke them when something looks off.

Issuing a token

Workspace settings → MCP clients → New client.

You'll set five fields:

Client name — Shows up in audit logs. Make it descriptive: Claude Code (alice@acme) reads better than token-3.
Project scope — Optional. When set, the token can only see and mutate sites/deployments in that project.
Scopes — Pick the minimum needed. Defaults to project:read, site:read, preview:read.
TTL — How long the token is valid. Default 90 days, max 365.
Notes — Free-text. Use it to record what the token is for.

The token is shown once on creation. Copy it; we don't store the plaintext.

Scope reference

Scopes are flat strings, not nested tiers. A token carries an explicit list and the API only honors the literal names below. The canonical list lives in [packages/shared/src/mcp-catalog.ts](https://github.com/flot/showly-platform/blob/main/packages/shared/src/mcp-catalog.ts) — this table and the catalog must stay in sync (a catalog-parity test fails the build if they drift).

Scope	Tier	Allows
`project:read`	read	`list_projects` — list and inspect projects this token can access
`site:read`	read	`list_sites`, `get_site_context`, `create_change_plan` — read site state
`site:write`	write	`apply_site_patch`, `create_site_from_template` — stage edits (never deploys directly)
`preview:read`	read	`get_preview_status` — read deployment status
`preview:create`	write	`create_preview` — materialise a preview from a changeset
`checks:run`	write	`run_checks` — read lint/typecheck/build/audit status
`publish:request`	write	`request_publish` — open an approval row for a production publish
`publish:confirm`	write	`publish_site` — two-step confirm-and-publish to production (in-conversation human confirmation; solo/non-approval plans)
`logs:read`	read	`get_deployment_logs` — tail build + runtime logs
`template:read`	read	`list_templates` — list available site templates
`template:create`	write	`create_site_from_template` — materialise a new site from a template

There is no implication ladder. Granting publish:request does not grant preview:create; pick exactly the scopes a client needs. The Web UI's "MCP token" panel surfaces this list as checkboxes; the same constant powers the role builder for custom RBAC roles.

Production publish and rollback (publish_site, rollback_deployment) are not MCP-exposed regardless of scopes. See the tool reference for the rationale.

What a tightly-scoped token looks like

For a _content-only_ agent that should never touch infrastructure:

Allowlist: only the marketing-site site.
Scopes: site:read, site:write. The agent can stage patches but cannot create previews or publish.
TTL: 30 days.

For a _deploy-bot_ in CI:

Allowlist: only the production site it's deploying.
Scopes: preview:read, preview:create, checks:run, publish:request. No site:write — patches come from CI's checked-in workflow, not the bot.
TTL: 14 days, rotated by CI.

For a _template-driven onboarding bot_:

Allowlist: any project the bot is invited to.
Scopes: project:read, template:read, template:create, site:write, preview:read, preview:create. Lets the bot pick a template, create the site, and watch the first preview build.
TTL: 7 days.

Rotation

Two paths:

Manual — Click Rotate on a client. Old token is revoked instantly; copy the new one and update your shell config.
Scheduled — Set a rotation cadence in Workspace settings → Token policy. Showly emails the client owner before expiry.

Revocation

Click Revoke to kill a token immediately. Any in-flight tool call using the revoked token gets a 401. The client name remains in audit logs (with a revoked flag) so historical entries still resolve.

If you think a token is compromised, revoke first, investigate second. A compromised token with publish:request scope can open a publish approval, but it still cannot bypass the human approver or step-up MFA on the approval flow.

Audit visibility

Every tool call writes an audit row containing the client id (not the token). You can:

Query all calls by a client: client_id eq <id>.
Query all calls writing a verb: action eq mcp.request_publish.
Export to your SIEM via the SIEM exporter (Enterprise).

What tokens cannot do

Cross-tenant reads. The token is bound to one workspace.
Bypass approvals. A publish:request scope grants the _ability to open_ an approval; the approval rules still apply.
Write to billing or RBAC. Those require a human + admin role + browser session.
Invoke publish_site or rollback_deployment. Those production verbs are not registered with the MCP server at all.

If a workflow needs more than publish:request, it's almost always a human workflow with a browser session, not a token.